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In recent Western philosophy we find two leading thinkers who have changed 
their approaches to truth and adopted methods that are opposite to those they 
previously employed. One of these thinkers is Ludwig Wittgenstein, whose anal­
ysis of language led him to reject philosophical analysis and to devote himself 
to the concrete and actual, dissolving the distinction berween subject and ob­
ject.* 1 In his study on Wittgenstein: Language and Philosophy^ Warren Shibles 
makes a direct comparison between Wittgenstein’s thinking and the teachings 
of early Chinese Ch’an masters such as Ma-tsu, Nan-chiian, Lin-chi, and Chao- 
chou. Both the Ch’an masters and Wittgenstein emphasize the limits of langu­
age and reject language which analyzes and distorts, creating differentiations 
between subject and object.
• Ch’an: Zen in Japanese.
1 Warren Shibles, Wittgenstein: Language and Philosophy. Iowa: Wm. C. Brown Book 
Company, 1969, p. 88.
Another thinker who originally pursued a subjective, analytical approach and 
then changed this method to a more direct, poetic approach is Martin Heideg­
ger. In 1929, when Heidegger published his famous work Being and Time, he him­
self confessed that his detailed analysis of the ontological structure of human ex­
perience had difficulty encountering Being. In his “Letter On Humanism” he 
comments:
The necessary...comprehension of this other way of thought—the 
thought that abandons subjectivity—is, however, made more difficult 
by the fact that at the publication of Sein und Zeit [firing and Time] the 
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third section of the first part, i.e., “Time and Being” was suppressed. 
Here, the whole thing is reversed. The section... was suppressed because 
the thinking failed to find language adequate to this reversal and did 
not succeed through the aid of the language of metaphysics.2
2 Martin Heidegger, “Letter on Humanism.” In Pbiloiopby in tbe Twentieth Century. Ed­
ited by William Barrett and Henry D. Aiken, New York: Random House, 1962, pp. 279- 
280.
3 Martin Heidegger, Identity and Difference. Translated by Joan Stambaugh, New York: 
Harper and Row, 1957, pp. 43.
4 Identity and Difference, op. cit., p. 42.
9 Ibid., p. 48.
6 Ibid., p. 49.
The reversals in the methods of thinking of Wittgenstein and Heidegger 
are both worthwhile to study. The present paper will concentrate on the recent 
approach of Heidegger and its relation to Ch’an Buddhism. Heidegger’s essen­
tial thinking is also called “meditative thinking.” It is the “other way of 
thought” referred to above. In order to discuss this “other way of thought” we 
may follow the comparison between Hegel’s thinking and Heidegger’s thinking 
which Heidegger himself has drawn in his Identity and Difference. Heidegger says 
that for Hegel, the “matter of thinking” is the Absolute Idea, or Reason. This 
Reason contains within itself the entire logical-dialectical process which unfolds 
in the actual world. Heidegger points out that near the end of his Science of 
Logic Hegel says; “Only the Absolute Idea is Being, imperishable life, self­
knowing Truth, and it is all Truth.”3 In short, the matter of thinking for Hegel 
is “the developed fullness in which what has been and now is thought.”4
For Heidegger, on the other hand, the matter of thinking is not what has al­
ready been thought, but what “has not been thought and from which what has 
been thought receives its essential space.”5 6
Hegel’s thinking has the character of the Absolute Concept. In his system, 
previous thinking is included into “a still higher development and systemati­
zation” which suppresses it. Thus, according to Heidegger, Hegel’s thinking has 
the character of “elevation” which “leads to the heightening and gathering... of 
truth...as absolute...in the sense of the completely developed certainty of self­
knowing knowledge.”*
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Heidegger’s thinking, however, is Mno longer an elevation, but the step 
back.” This step back “points to the realm which until now has been skipped 
over, and from which the essence of truth becomes first of all worthy of 
thought.**7 Heidegger says: “The step back does not mean an isolated step of 
thought but rather means the manner in which thinking moves and a long path 
...Our thinking...leads us away from what has been thought so far in philoso­
phy. Thinking...brings what is thought into a confrontation in which we behold 
the whole of this history—behold it with respect to what constitutes the source 
of the entire thinking.”8 * For Hegel, this is a traditional problem; but for Hei­
degger, it is “what has always remained unasked in the history of thinking.”’
7 ibid.
• Ibid., p. 50.
* Ibid.
In Chinese Neo-Confucianist philosophy we encounter thinking which is sim­
ilar to Hegel’s rational thought. For Neo-Confucianists, thinking evolves or de­
velops rationally. It is universal and transcendental, and is called /r, or Principle, 
or Reason. Lt is the timeless totality of all truth in the universe and is sometimes 
called the Ultimate, or T’ai Cbi. In short, li is absolute conceptual Reason which 
is close to Hegel’s Absolute Idea. A School of Li has developed in China from the 
twelfth century until recent times. The discovery of the reality of li enables man 
to attain to an eternal, pure, and ideal world.
In contrast to the Neo-Confucianist School of li, there is the School of Ch’an 
in Chinese Buddhism, which stresses non-conceptual and non-analytical think­
ing in an intuitive approach to reality. Ch’an’s thinking is neither cognitive nor 
abstract but is intuitive, concrete, and factual. The thinking of the School of 
Li creates the dichotomy between the knower and the known. In the School 
of Ch’an, the knower and the known are one. This oneness is the root which is 
prior to all dichotomies.
In his reply to Hu Shih’s letter in Pbiiotopby East and Wst, Daisetz T. Suzuki 
discusses Ch’an epistemology. He says that we can have two kinds of informa­
tion about reality. The first is called “knowable knowledge” and is knowledge 
about reality. The second is called “unknowable knowledge” and is that which 
comes out of reality itself. Knowable knowledge involves the distinction be­
tween subject as knower and object as known. All knowledge which is based on 
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this dichotomy is knowable because it is public and accessible to everyone. Un­
knowable knowledge, on the other hand, is individual knowledge which is the 
result of an inner experience. Yet the man who has such private knowledge is at 
the same time convinced of its universality. He knows that it is inherent in 
everybody, but everybody is just not aware of it.10
10 Daisetz T. Suzuki, “Zen: A Reply to Hu Shih.” In Philosophy East and IP’ett (April 
1953) Volume HI, No. 1, p. 33.
11 Martin Heidegger, “The Way Back into the Ground of Metaphysics.” In Philosophy 
tn the Twentieth Century. Edited by William Barrett and Henry D. Aiken, New York: Ran­
dom House, 1962, p. 209.
12 “Letter on Humanism,” op. ar., p. 209.
13 Identity and Difference, op. df.t p. 71.
Knowable knowledge is relative knowledge. Unknowable knowledge is ab­
solute knowledge which cannot be communicated through words or ideas. It is 
the knowledge one has of himself directly and immediately, without any medi­
ation between himself and his knowledge. It is the origin of all knowledge and 
“is not knowledge itself.”
According to Heidegger, the nature of truth always appears to metaphysics 
in “the derivative form of the truth of knowledge and the truth of propositions 
which formulate our knowledge”;11 truth as unconcealedness, however, may be 
prior to all metaphysical truth. The knowledge to which Heidegger refers is 
the “knowable knowledge” of Ch’an Buddhism. It is the manifestation of uncon­
cealedness which belongs to metaphysics, but not to the origin of metaphysics. 
The thinking of metaphysics is what Heidegger calls representational thinking 
which is the traditional, logical thinking of metaphysics. It cannot reach the ori­
gin of metaphysics which is rhe nature of its truth. What is needed to reach this 
origin is a more rigorous, essential thinking which is not logical or rational but is 
an intuitive return to the origin of metaphysical thought. In Heidegger’s words:
If our thinking should Succeed in its efforts to go back into the ground 
of metaphysics it might well help to bring about a change in human 
nature, accompanied by a transformation of metaphysics.12
In Identity and Difference Heidegger’s thinking is directed to a realm “which 
the key words of metaphysics—Being and beings, the ground and what is 
grounded—are no longer adequate to utter.”13 These words refer to what differs 
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between Being and beings. The origin of the difference cannot be thought within 
the realm of metaphysics. Here, Heidegger’s thinking is “on its way” to the 
path into the origin of metaphysics. It achieves the step back “out of metaphys­
ics into the active essence of metaphysics.”14 The step back must yet pass 
through the difficulty which lies in language. For Heidegger, “Western langu­
ages are languages of metaphysical thinking.” What is needed to accomplish 
the step back are “other possibilities of utterance—and that means at the same 
time of a telling silence.”15
14 Ito., p. 72.
15 /W, p.73.
16 Martin Heidegger, Duconrit on Thinking. Translated by John M. Anderson and E. 
Hans Freund, New York: Harper and Row, Publishers, 1959, p. 25.
" lW,p. 13.
18 ibid., p. 26.
Once man accomplishes the step back and “a telling silence” he will attain to 
his real or authentic nature which is the “higher activity” of meditative think­
ing. Essential thinking is the means discovered by Heidegger to achieve a “di­
rect and immediate reference beyond man to Being.”16 “Releasement toward 
things” and “openness to the mystery” are two essential aspects of this way of 
thinking. Through them, man will attain “a kind of transmutation” of himself 
which will enable him “to pass out of bondage to what is clear and evident...to 
what is ultimate, however obscure and difficult that may be.”17
We can also understand Heidegger’s “releasement toward things” and “open­
ness to the mystery” in Ch’an terms. In Ch’an, releasement toward things and 
openness to the mystery mean “isness” or letting things be themselves; that is, 
letting the flower be red and the willow green. It means to shiver in the winter 
and to enjoy the breeze in the summer. Through such releasement, in Heideg­
ger’s words, we are “taking a stand which reveals Being;” that is, we are “in­
dwelling” or “dwelling in Being.”18 In Ch’an this means to abide in the Tao and 
to be open to the reality of things.
Prior to his recent approach of essential thinking, Heidegger tried to work 
out the question of Being through an analysis of the ontological structures of 
man’s Being, i.e., the primordial whole of Dasein, in terms of the ground of tem­
porality. For Heidegger, man is essentially historical. However, he does not con­
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ceive of history in the relative sense as “the connectedness of morions of ob­
jects,” nor as a “free-floating sequence of experiences” of subjects. History is 
more primordially interpreted as the entire “ ‘context’ of events and ‘effects’ 
which draws on through the past, present, and future.”1* This seems similar 
to what Chuang-tzu said in his chapter on the “Identity of Contraries:” “The 
sage blends everything into one harmonious whole, rejecting rhe confusion of 
this and that...he contemplates ten thousand years and unifies them in perfect 
purity. Ten thousand things are all what they are, yer among them there is mu­
tual solution.”
19 Martin Heidegger, Beinf^ and Tine. Translated by John Macquarrie and Edward 
Robinson, New York: Harper and Row, Publishers, 1962, p. 430.
20 IM., pp. 41-42.
« IM., p. 377.
22 Masunaga Reiho, The Soto Approach to Zen. Tokyo: Layman Buddhist Society Press,
1958. pp. 68-69.
The possibility of history lies in the fundamental historicity of man’s Being. 
Historicity is the ground for the understanding of Being which is handed down 
to us through human history. Historicity is grounded in historicality which is 
the Being of man in its very basis. The “hidden basis” of authentic historicality, 
in turn, is authentic temporality. Thus, the primordial basis of man’s historical 
Being-in-the-world is temporality.19 20
For Heidegger, temporality or primordial time is not ordinary, relative time 
which is accessible to the ordinary understanding. Ordinary rime is a “pure se­
quence of nows” in which the now, or present is separated from the past and 
the future. Primordial time, on the other hand, is the basis of authentic exis­
tence. It constitutes the unity of past, present, and future and is the source of all 
ordinary or “derivative” time.21
In Ch’an Buddhism, we also find primordial time which is not merely “con­
tentless form” but is identified with Being itself. In Ch’an this means that time 
docs not have a separate substance, but is identified with existence. That is, time 
is existence, existence is time. As Dogen, the founder of Soto Zen in Japan in 
the thirteenth century says: “The time we call spring blossoms directly as an 
existence called flowers. The flowers, in turn, express the time called spring. 
This is not existence within time; existence itself is time.”22 *
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In Ch’an, primordial time is also distinguished from ordinary or “specific” 
time which is expressed as “this time” or “that time.” Specific time is separated 
into past, present, and future while primordial or “basic” time, as in Heideg­
ger’s thinking, is the unity of past, present and future. It is the source from 
which ordinary time arises and to which it returns.
Although we do find similarities between Heidegger’s primordial time and pri­
mordial time in Ch’an, what we have said indicates that we are still in the realm 
of conceptualization. The thinking in Heidegger’s later approach is “beyond ac­
tivity and passivity” and does not conceptualize in such terms as temporality 
or historicity. Thus, in the “Conversation on a Country Path” Heidegger clear­
ly states that “history...does not consist in the happenings and deeds of the 
world...nor in the cultural achievements of man ..the historical rests in that- 
which-regions...ir rests in what, coming to pass in man, regions him into his 
nature.”23 For Heidegger, “man in his very nature belongs to that-which-regi- 
ons, i.e., he is released to it...Not occasionally, but—how shall we say it—prior 
to everything....The prior, of which we really can not think...because the na­
ture of thinking begins there....Thus man’s nature is released to that-which- 
regions in what is prior to thought.”24 Heidegger’s term that-which-regions is 
used to indicate Being itself. In Anderson’s Introduction to Discouru on Thinking 
we read: “In the Conversation...Heidegger does not use the word Being; but 
in order to stress the inherent openness and activity of Being, he uses the word 
region and its cognates instead.”25 Further, he comments: “Since that-which- 
regions is a regioning, a movement, we can understand man’s nature as brought 
forth in this movement. That-which-regions is a dynamic ground in which 
man’s nature emerges.”25 This nature which belongs to that-which-regions “in 
what is prior to thought” in Ch’an would be called man’s original nature27 or 
Buddha nature28 which is free from the dichotomy of subjectivity and objec­
tivity and is the origin of all differentiations.
27 Daisetz T. Suzuki, Enajr in Zen Baddhttm (Second Series). London, Rider and Com­
pany, 1958, p. 203.
“ I^,p.4z.
23 Being and 7ww, of. dr., pp. 41 -42.
24 Ibid., p. 377.
25 Ditconru on Thinking, op. cit., p. 27.
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In zfn Introduction to Metafbyria Heidegger discusses the traditional differenti­
ation between Being as object, and thinking as subject. What Heidegger seeks 
to understand is “the origin of the differentiation”29 in which the dichotomy of 
subjectivity and objectivity is abandoned. For Heidegger, Being and thinking 
are “one and the same.” The unity that is meant in this “self-sameness” is “the 
unity of the belonging together of antagonisms. This is original Oneness.30
29 Martin Heidegger, An Introduction to Metaphysics. Translated by Ralph Manheim. 
New York: Anchor Books, Doubleday and Company, 1953, p. 122.
30 Ibid., p. 117.
31 Suzuki, Essays in Zen Buddhism (First Series), New York: Harper and Row, 1949, p. 
113.
32 “Conversation on a Country Path,” op. dr., p. 86.
33 Ibid.,?. 86.
34 Ibid., p. 61.
Being and thinking thought together in this way in Ch’an Buddhism is i nicn, 
or one-thoughr. It is the thought that “abandons subjectivity” and is called 
the “mind of no-mind.” It is thinking that is free from objective limitations as 
well as from subjective orientations and distortions. One-thought viewing signi­
fies our inner awareness of ultimate reality, and not knowledge that is intellect­
ually acquired. Through it, we break loose from the bonds of relative knowledge 
and are able to view things in one-thought.31 Thus, we see that Heidegger’s 
thinking is similar to the one-thought viewing of Ch’an. Through one-thought 
viewing or essential thinking, in Heidegger’s thought, man’s essential nature is 
revealed.
According to Heidegger the nature of essential or meditative thinking is man’s 
“in-dwelling releasement to that-which-regions;” that is, man’s opening to Be­
ing itself. “That-which-regions regions all, gathering everything together and 
letting everything return to itself, to rest in its own identity.”32 It is “the near­
ness of distance, and the distance of nearness.”33 In his “Conversation on a 
Country Path” Heidegger expresses the experience of thinking during the 
“Conversation” as “coming near to and so at the same time remaining distant 
from that-which-regions.” Or, as he says: “Releasement lies...beyond the dis­
tinction between activity and passivity.”34 It is a “higher activity of think­
ing” which is beyond relative distinctions. “Higher acting is yet no activity” 
according to both Heidegger and Ch’an. Affirmation simultaneously followed by
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immediate negation is the approach of cbtfhknng miao-yu, or real void and subtle 
reality. According to Ch’an, “when we say that something is real, it is not a 
relative reality. When we say that it is void, it is not a relative void. What is 
real is void; what is void, is real. This identification of the void and the real is 
achieved by the absolute mind, which is free of all dichotomy. It is the emergence 
of constant consciousness which is conscious of itself. And yet it is not different 
from the ordinary mind.”35 The emergence of this consciousness may be identi­
fied with Heidegger’s conception of Licbtung, or clearing and lighting.36
Ch’an Buddhists define this mind of consciousness which is free from subjec­
tivity as “neither Being nor Non-being and simultaneously neither not-Being 
nor not Non-being.” This mind is achieved by the refined approach of the San- 
lun School (the Chinese Madhyamika School) called the Double Truth on Three 
Levels. On the third level the higher truth is both not Being and not Non-being 
and neither not Being nor not Non-being. At this level, one of the earliest Ch’an 
Buddhists says: “Not only are the means of expression destroyed, but the roots 
of mental activity itself are cut out.” This is what Ch’an Buddhists call the mind 
of no-mind which is free from the bondage of subjectivity. Although these three 
levels form a refined dialectic, their purpose, according to the San-lun School, 
is to free the mind from logical bondage. I wonder whether this logical approach 
which is yet free from logic would be acceptable to Heidegger, who says: “That- 
which-regions is the nearness of distance and the distance of nearness...a 
characterization which should not be thought of dialectically.”37
Both Heidegger’s meditative thinking and one-thought viewing in Ch’an 
indicate man’s ontological experience. That is, through such thinking man ex­
periences his own true nature which is identified with the truth of Being itself. 
For Heidegger and for Ch’an ontological experience is identified with aesthetic 
feeling. As Heidegger says: “Art is one way in which truth happens.”38 In
35 Chang Chung-yuan, Original Teaching of Ch’an Buddhitm. New York: Pantheon 
Books, 1969, p. 13.
36 Being and Time, op. at., p. 171.
37 “Conversation on a Country Path,” op. at., p. 86.
38 Martin Heidegger, “The Origin of the Work of Art” in Pbilowpbiet of Art and Beauty. 
Edited by Albert Hofstadter and Richard Kuhns, New York: The Modem Library, 1964, 
p. 647
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Ch’an, ontological experience is identified with the highest aesthetic achieve­
ment. Thus, what we have said concerning Heidegger’s “openness to rhe mys­
tery” and “releasement toward things” may be concretely exemplified through 
a comparison of the basic aesthetic principles of Heidegger and Ch’an.
As we know, Kant’s great step is to identify the realm of aesthetics as a do­
main of human experience which is as high as the cognitive and the moral. The 
three realms distinguished by Kant, i.e., nature, morality, and art, are each 
governed by their own a priori principle: nature by the principle of conformity 
to law, morality by the principle of final purpose, and art by the principle of pur- 
posiveness. Kant maintains that there is a fundamental ground of unity between 
the realms of nature and morality which makes possible the transition from ordi­
nary understanding to higher moral reason. The idea of this ground of unity is 
contained within the aesthetic principle of purposiveness. According to this 
principle, the aesthetic judgment forms the mediating link between morality 
and nature.39
” Immanuel Kant, Critique of . Translated by J. H. Bernard, New York: Haf­
ner Publishing Company, 1966, p. xxxii.
40 Benedetto Croce, yfevAetie. Translated by Douglas Ainslie, New York: The Noon­
day Press, 1968, p. 274.
It follows that the beautiful, as the object of the aesthetic judgment, is a sym­
bol of the morally good. The sensible element in beautiful art is always in har­
mony and conformity with the moral ideas. Thus, as Croce says: The teleological 
judgment in Kant’s philosophy is “the basis and condition for the aesthetic.”40 
Thar is, at the basis of the form of beauty there is a logical concept of purpose. 
The beautiful is merely an ornament through which to express the logical 
concept. Thus, for Kant, aestherical perfection is not as high as logical 
perfection.
Kant divides the world into the realms of sensible appearance and supersensi­
ble reality, or things-in-themselves. Human, finite knowledge and experience 
are limited to the sensible realm. Man cannot know or experience the transcen­
dental things-in-themselves, but can only think them in the transcendental 
ideas of reason. Kant’s aesthetics belongs to the sensible world of appearances, 
and cannot attain to transcendental reality. Thus, as Croce says:
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He [Kant] finds no place for imagination amongst powers of the spirit, 
but places it among the facts of sensation. He knows a reproductive 
imagination and an associative, but he knows nothing of a genuinely 
productive imagination...41
41 IM., p. 277.
« IM., p. 299.
« IM.
44 IM.
Hegel went beyond Kant in his conception of a mental imagination which is 
both imagination and intellect. This mental imagination is capable of attaining 
to the highest Idea or reality, while for Kant, imagination is merely sensible and 
therefore limited to the appearances of the sensible world. For Hegel, as Croce 
comments:
Artistic imagination does not work in the same way as the passive or 
receptive fancy, it does not stop at the appearances of sensible reality 
but searches for the internal truth and rationality of the real.42 *
For Kant, art and beauty cannot be identified with the ultimate or absolute. 
Aesthetics is merely a symbol of morality or the sensible illustration of super­
sensible ideas. For Hegel, art and beauty are raised to the level of rhe Absolute. 
Beauty and truth are one and the same. Truth is the Idea as Idea; beauty is the 
Idea in its appearance. In art, the sensible form and the spiritual content inter­
penetrate and form a unified whole. As Hegel says: “An ideal content must 
gleam through the sensible form; the form is spiritualized by this ideal light.”45 
Thus, “no successful work of art can issue from light and careless imagina­
tion.”44
Hegel places art in the realm of rhe Absolute Spirit. This is perhaps the great­
est merit of his philosophy, but it also brought him to difficulty. Art is merely a 
transitory phase in the developing and self-unfolding of the Absolute. In Hegel’s 
words:
We have assigned...a very high place to art: bur...neither in content 
nor in form can art be considered the most perfect means of bringing 
before the consciousness of the mind its true interests. Precisely by 
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reason of its form, art is limited to a particular content. Only a 
definite...grade of truth can be made visible in a work of art; that is 
to say, such truth as may be transfused into the sensible and adequately 
presented in that form, as were the Greek gods.43 *5
43 IM., p. 302.
46 IM.
47 “The Origin of the Work of Art,” of. dt.> p. 647.
48 W, p. 664.
For Hegel, art is the earliest and lowest phase in the self-unfolding of rhe Ab­
solute Idea, and can never reach as high as philosophy. Philosophy is able to 
express a deeper truth than art. Thus, Hegel maintains:
Thought and reflexion have superseded fine art...Art in its highest 
form is...a thing of the past.46
The difficulties of aesthetic achievement encountered in Hegel’s system are 
eliminated in Heidegger’s thought. Hegel wanted to identify beauty and truth, 
but he made beauty a lower form of truth. For Heidegger, however, beauty and 
truth are perfectly identified. Indeed, art is “an origin of the establishment of 
truth.”47 The art to which Heidegger refers is the origin of art. The truth of this 
art is not merely the truth of a particular thing, but a revelation of the being of 
all that is.
Heidegger’s identification of beauty and truth is quite close to the identi­
fication of aesthetic feeling and ontological experience in Ch’an. To identify aes­
thetic feeling and ontological experience is a basic contribution of Ch’an art, 
and may be expressed in the saying: “Heaven and Earth and I share the same 
root; ten thousand things and I belong to one body.” When nature, or spirit and 
man are identified, the difficulties of the dichotomy of art and spirit are resolved.
In his essay on “The Origin of the Work of Art” Heidegger says that when we 
stand before a great painting, such as Van Gogh’s painting of peasant shoes, 
the painting speaks to us. “In the vicinity of the work we are suddenly some­
where other than we are accustomed to be.”48 We arc removed from our usual 
condition and enter into the truth that is disclosed by the work, thus bringing 
our own essence to a stand in the truth of what is. The “somewhere other” to 
which Heidegger refers is dose to what Laurence Binyon, a critic of Asian art, 
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calls the “rarer atmosphere” into which he was drawn while gazing at an anci­
ent Chinese landscape painting. For Heidegger, Van Gogh’s painting reveals 
the truth of the peasant shoes. The shoes emerge into the unconccalment of 
their being. The truth of the work of art happens as the “primal conflict” be­
tween lighting and concealing.49 The essence of truth is in this “conflict” in 
which the “Open” is achieved, in which the truth of what is is revealed.50 Thus, 
the art work is the “conflict” in which the unconcealment of what is takes place, 
and the truth of things is revealed.
49 IW., p. 680
50 Ibid., p. 684.
51 Ibid., p. 661.
53 Martin Heidegger, uAm der Erfabrwtg dts Denkem." A pamphlet published in 
twelve poems, 1965.
For Heidegger, the thinking which is involved in the work of art enables us to 
“turn toward the entity, think upon it in itself in regard to irs being, bur...at 
the same time let it rest upon itself in its essence.”51 This is theessential thinking 
which is expressed in Heidegger’s poem “From the Experience of Thinking,” in 
which we read:
The poetic character of thinking is still veiled; where it shows itself, 
it resembles for a long time the utopia of a serene, poetic mind.
But the thoughtful thinking is in reality the topology of being.52
The unconcealment of the truth of things in meditative thinking reveals the 
origin of art. This origin may be the meeting point between Heidegger’s essen­
tial thinking and Ch’an thought. Based upon this meeting point, let us examine 
how “essential thinking” takes place in Ch’an art. First, let us hear what the 
famous Chinese painter Ch’i Pe-shih has to say.
According to Ch’i Pe-shih, his method of painting proceeds in such a way 
that it is between similarity and dissimilarity. If his painting were entirely simi­
lar to the ordinary object, he said, it would be vulgar. If it were entirely dif­
ferent, it would be cheating the world. In terms of the self-identity of opposites 
which we have found in both Heidegger and Ch’an, Ch’i Pe-shih’s painting is 
free from the opposites of actuality and non-actuality. This absolute freedom of 
the mind in producing great art is a basic contribution of Ch’an philosophy.
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This process of creativity in art may be illustrated in the following Ch’an poem:
The wild geese fly across the long sky above.
Their image is reflected in the chilly water below.
The geese do not mean to cast their image on the water. 
Nor does the water mean to hold the image of the geese.
This poem indicates that aesthetic feeling and ontological experience are identi­
fied as one. This identity takes place in the absolute moment which cannot be 
conceived as ordinary time. It is primordial time which creates a great work of 
art. In the absolute moment the mind of the artist is free from limitations and 
distortions. It is that which is beyond all opposites and diversities. In the Chi­
nese expression, this is Absolute Oneness which is called or Non-being, or 
Nothing in Heidegger’s sense. When this Oneness or Non-being takes place in 
the mind, it is one-thought viewing. From one-thought viewing, ten thousand 
things are produced. For Heidegger, through meditative thinking man opens to 
the being of all that is. In Chuang-tzu we read:
There is an ultimate reality in things. Things in their ultimate reality 
are curved without the help of arcs, straight without lines, round 
without compasses, and rectangular without right angles...In this 
manner all things create themselves from their own inward reflection 
and none can tell how they come to do so.53
When inner reflection takes place, the process of manifesting ultimate reality 
is fulfilled. In this direct, immediate, and spontaneous process, we find the curve 
simply reflecting its curve and the line its straightness. It is as the wild geese 
casting their images upon the water without intention. This spontaneous, di­
rect, reflection indicates the absolute moment in which aesthetic feeling and on­
tological experience are identified. This absolute moment leads to self-realiza­
tion of the highest affirmation of Non-being, or Nothing.
From what we have discussed above, we may now come to the fundamental 
question of the meaning of Non-being, or Nothing which may be the chief con­
tribution of Buddhist philosophy, particularly with respect to Ch’an in this 
paper. In “The Way Back into the Ground of Metaphysics” Heidegger asks:
M Crtativity and Taoism, of. dt., p. 66.
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“Why is there any Being at all and not rather Nothing?” He does not give an 
immediate answer, but inquires further: “How did it come about that things 
take precedence everywhere and lay claim to every ‘is’ while that which is not 
is understood as Nothing, though it is Being itself, and remains forgotten?”54 
For Heidegger, “Being and Nothing hang together.”55 * Heidegger defines Be­
ing as: “This, the purely 'Other* than everything that ‘is,’ is that-which-is- 
not...yet this Nothing functions as Being.”55 What, then, is this Nothing in 
Heidegger’s thinking? Perhaps we may better understand it by comparing it 
with the Nothing as described in Ch’an.
54 “The Way Back into the Ground of Metaphysics,” of. cu.y p. ai8.
55 Martin Heidegger, “What Is Metaphysics?” In Existcnu axd Bax^. Translated by 
R. F. C. Hull and Alan Crick, Chicago, Illinois: Henry Regnery Company, 1967, p. 346.
54 1M., p. 333.
57 !W., p. 331.
58 Daisetz T. Suzuki, The Eftextulr of Zr* B»<Ubu*. New York: E. P. Dutton and Co., 
1962, p. 33.
Firstly, Heidegger’s Nothing is not a purely negative Nothing. In “What Is 
Metaphysics?” Heidegger asks:
Does Nothing exist only because the not, i.e., negation exists? Or is it 
the other way about? Does negation and the not exist only because 
Nothing exists?....We assert: Nothing is more original than the not 
and negation.57
For Heidegger, then, Nothing is rhe source of negation, not the other way 
about.
Ch’an’s Nothing is also not merely negation. In Suzuki we read:
If we want to get to the truth of things, we must see them from the 
point where...rhe consciousness of this and that has not yet been 
awakened and where the mind is absorbed in its...serenity and empti­
ness. This is a world of negations, but leading to a higher or absolute 
affirmation—an affirmation in the midst of negations.58
This higher affirmation is the origin of negation and is prior to all processes of 
reason. Therefore, “when Zen denies, it is not necessarily a denial in the logical 
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sense. The same can be said of an affirmation.’*59 What Suzuki refers to as 
“higher affirmation” may be close to Heidegger’s “more original” Nothing 
which is neither the not nor negation.
59 Ibid., p. 36.
60 “What Is Metaphysics?” op. at., pp. 33a-333.
61 Suzuki, “Zen: A Reply to Hu Shih,” ap. cit., p. 43.
62 “What Is Metaphysics?” cp. rir., p. 340.
63 “Memorial Address.” In Diiumru On TMing, op. cit., pp. 56-57.
Secondly, Nothing in Heidegger’s thinking is not “imaginary Nothing.” 
When we seek the Nothing, he says, “we can think of the whole of what is... 
and then negate what we have thus imagined. In this way we arrive ar...imagi­
nary Nothing, but never Nothing itself.”60
Nothingness in Ch’an is also not imagined Nothingness. Nothing is not a pas­
sive contemplation or imagination; rather Nothing is beyond activity and pas­
sivity. That is, in Nothing activity and passivity are one. In Suzuki we read: 
“When the Zen experience...is brought to conceptualization, it is no more the 
experience itself; it turns into something else.”61 That is why the Nothing is re­
vealed in daily activities, whether picking tea leaves, or sweeping the floor, or 
hoeing the fields. This Nothing is not imagination, but is concrete, living activi­
ties. In the Ch’an expression: “Carrying water, chopping wood; therein is the 
T-w.”
In a more positive sense, Nothing for Heidegger may be considered the basis 
and potentiality of creativity. As he says: “Nothing is that which makes the 
revelation of what-is as such possible for our human existence.”62 63Further we 
read in his “Memorial Address.”65
If releasement toward things and openness to the mystery’ awaken 
within us, then we should arrive at a path that will lead to a new 
ground and foundation. In that ground, the creativity which produces 
lasting works could strike new roots.
This “new ground” in Heidegger’s thinking may be illustrated by the Ch’an 
analogy of water and waves. From the ordinary point of view, creation is re­
presented by the waves, and the water is neglected. From the Buddhist point 
of view, the real creator is the water itself, which is one with the waves. We see 
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the increasing and decreasing of a thousand waves and think that it is the real 
process of creation. We neglect that within the thousand waves there is the 
water, which is the real creator. The water never increases or decreases, nor 
comes into being or disappears. This water, according to Ch’an Buddhism, is 
the mind of no-mind, or the form of formless.
Not long ago, Nishida Kitaro of Kyoto, the leading philosopher in modem 
Japan, wrote:
In contradistinction to Western culture, which considers form as exis­
tence and formation as good, the urge to see the form of the formless, 
and to hear the sound of the soundless lies at the very foundation of 
Eastern culture.64
64 Nishida Kitaro, A Study of Good. Translated by V. H. Viglielmo, Japan: Printing 
Bureau, Japanese Government, i960, p. 211.
65 “Conversation on a Country Path,” of. dr., p. 61.
66 William Barrett, Introduction to Zen Ruddbitm by Daisetz T. Suzuki. New York: 
Doubleday and Company, Inc., 1956, p. xi.
Perhaps if Nishida had read the “Conversation on a Country Path” he would 
have recognized this same “urge to see the form of the formless” in Heidegger’s 
search for the nature of essential thinking. What Heidegger discovers in essen­
tial thinking is releasement, within which “a higher acting is concealed...than 
is found in all the actions within the world.”65 This “higher acting is yet no 
activity” and is the nature of essential thinking or the “mind of no-mind” 
in Ch’an. In both Heidegger’s essential thinking and the mind of no-mind in 
Ch’an, man achieves rhe “step back” into his origins and awakens to his true 
self.
In our comparative analysis we have seen that the basic elements of Heideg­
ger’s essential thinking and Ch’an thought are coming towards each other. As 
William Barrett says in his Introduction to Suzuki’s Ztn Bttddhitm:
Certainly Heidegger’s philosophy in its tone and temper and sources 
is Western to its core, and there is much in him that is not in Zen, but 
also very much more in Zen that is not in Heidegger; and yet the 
points of correspondence between the two...are startling enough.66
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If my study is not incorrect, we might say that Heidegger’s recent approach 
of essential or meditative thinking may serve as one of the bridges that will 
bring the philosophies of rhe East and the West together.
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